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Notes
Risky Propositions:
A New Standard for the Award of Attorney’s
Fees Against Defendant-Intervenors in
Ballot-Initiative Litigation
Matthew Slevin*
In the current federal litigation regarding the constitutionality of Proposition 8, a ballot
initiative that amended the California state constitution to ban same-sex marriage, the
issue of which party should pay the prevailing plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees was raised at
the district court in 2009. The official proponents of the same-sex marriage ban, who
intervened to defend the law at trial and lost, argued that they should not be held liable
for the fees. But if they are correct, then the State of California, which did not defend
the law and called it unconstitutional, could be made to pay if a final judgment is
reached in the plaintiffs’ favor. The issue has been postponed as the case moves
through the appellate process. Using the Proposition 8 case as a prominent example,
this Note explores the issue of who should pay a plaintiff’s attorney’s fees when the
proponent of a successful ballot initiative intervenes to defend its law against a civil
rights challenge and loses. It is a significant question not only in the context of the
Proposition 8 case, but also in the larger context of the citizen-created ballot initiatives
permitted in twenty-five jurisdictions. The Note proposes the adoption of a new
standard in both federal and state courts for ballot-initiative litigation, under which the
defendant-intervenor will be held liable for the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees unless it can
show that its position was substantially justified.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012; B.S., Syracuse
University, 2004. Thank you to Professor David Levine for his extensive guidance throughout the
writing process, and the Journal staff for their hard work and camaraderie. Thank you also to Dara for
her constant love and support, and to Mom, Dad, and Jeremy, without whom this Note would not
have been possible.
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Introduction
Over seven million California voters went to the polls in November
1
2008 and voted “yes” on Proposition 8, thus amending the state
2
constitution to ban same-sex marriage. The resulting federal constitutional
3
challenge to that ban, Perry v. Brown, is currently progressing through

1. Debra Bowen, Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement of Vote: Nov. 4, 2008, General Election 13
(2008).
2. Proposition 8 provides, “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.” Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5; see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
927 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Proposition 8 is invalid under the U.S. Constitution); Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009) (holding that Proposition 8 is a valid amendment to the California
state constitution).
3. See Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7,
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the federal courts. In the case, two same-sex couples sued the State of
California, alleging that Proposition 8 was an infringement on their civil
4
rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. After state officials
refused to defend the law because they too believed it to be
unconstitutional, Proposition 8’s official proponent, Protectmarriage.com,
5
intervened to defend it. As the case proceeds on appeal, the legal fees
for the attorneys on both sides of the case continue to mount. The issue
of whether Protectmarriage.com, rather than the State of California, will
be liable to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees if the plaintiffs prevail has
6
been raised but thus far left open.
The Perry case brings into focus a question that has the potential to
arise in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia, where citizen7
created ballot initiatives are utilized. The issue of who should pay the
8
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees when an initiative proponent intervenes to
defend its law against a civil rights challenge and does not prevail likely
will continue to confront both federal and state courts as it has in the
9
past. And cases like Perry, where the state refuses to defend the law,
2012). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, on different grounds, the district court ruling in Perry I that
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. Id. at *2. The court also found that Protectmarriage.com, Proposition
8’s official proponent and defendant-intervenor in the case, had standing to appeal the District Court’s
judgment. Id. at *7. Previously, the Ninth Circuit had certified a question to the California Supreme
Court regarding the standing question. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry II), 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th
Cir. 2011), certified question answered sub nom. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011).
The state court answered in the affirmative that initiative proponents do have the authority to assert
the state’s interest in the validity of ballot propositions. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1015.
4. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927. In the previous state-court challenge to Proposition 8, the
California Supreme Court held that it was a valid amendment to the state constitution. Strauss, 207
P.3d at 122.
5. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 921, 928.
6. Order at 2–3, Perry I, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (order granting plaintiffs’
motion to extend time). For an early discussion of these issues, see Rebecca Beyer, Prop. 8 Plaintiffs
May Recoup Fees, Daily J., Sept. 16, 2010, available at www.uchastings.edu/media-and-news/news/
2010/09/levine-prop8-fees.html.
7. Initiatives are proposals for new state laws or constitutional amendments created by citizens
and added to the electoral ballot upon the acquisition of a set number of citizen signatures. For a
detailed explanation of initiatives and other types of ballot propositions, see What Are Ballot
Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, Initiative & Referendum Inst. Univ. S. Cal.,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%20What%20is%20I&R.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2012). In order of adoption, the states that allow such initiatives are South Dakota, Utah, Oregon,
Nevada, Montana, Oklahoma, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Colorado, Arkansas, California, Arizona,
Nebraska, Idaho, Ohio, Washington, Mississippi, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Alaska, Wyoming,
Illinois, Florida, and the District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 1-1001.16 (2010); State-By State List of
Initiative and Referendum Provisions, Initiative & Referendum Inst. Univ. S. Cal.,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i&r.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
8. The proponent of an initiative measure, as officially recognized by the California Elections
Code, is a citizen who has presented a proposed initiative to the State before circulating a petition to
have it placed on the ballot. Cal. Elec. Code § 9001 (2010).
9. One prominent federal initiative case is Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43
(1997). In that case (later dismissed for mootness), a state employee challenged an Arizona initiative
that made English the official state language, and the initiative sponsors intervened as defendants. Id.
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may come up again as well. Statutes exist in federal law and in all of the
states providing specific exceptions to the general American Rule that
10
litigating parties must pay their own attorney’s fees. One ubiquitous
exception provides that in a civil rights suit, a prevailing party, other than
the government, may recoup its legal fees from the losing party or
11
parties. Federal and state courts, however, have each reached different
conclusions as to which branch of government may fashion such
12
exceptions. In the federal system, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated
13
that Congress must create such exceptions. In some states, including
California, courts have ruled that exceptions can be fashioned by judges
14
as well as the legislature.
The Perry case is a prominent, but not isolated, example of a court
being asked to decide whether a defendant-intervenor is liable for paying
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff under a law that shifts fees in civil rights
challenges. In 2004 in Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed, the
15
plaintiffs prevailed in a civil rights challenge to a Washington state law.
The Ninth Circuit followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
16
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes in finding liability
17
for fees against the defendant-intervenors. The Zipes Court held that an
intervenor in a civil rights case will be liable for attorney’s fees only if the
18
intervenor’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”
In Reed, the Ninth Circuit applied this standard. Finding the intervenor’s

at 49–50, 56. In California, the initiatives regarding same-sex marriage have been challenged in both
state and federal courts. Proposition 8 was preceded in 2000 by Proposition 22, a successful initiative
that banned same-sex marriage via statute. Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5 (2010); Lockyer v. City of S.F.,
95 P.3d 459, 463 (Cal. 2004). The California Supreme Court subsequently held that San Francisco
public officials had acted unlawfully in issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples under
Proposition 22. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 464. In 2008, the court found Prop. 22 invalid under the state
constitution. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). Then, before the current federal
challenge in Perry, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 as a valid amendment to the
state constitution. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 122.
10. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (announcing the American Rule);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021 (2010) (codifying the American Rule); infra
Part I.A.1.
11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2010); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 (2010); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 8601 (McKinney 2011); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8309 (2011); see also 1 Court Awarded
Attorney Fees 5.03 (MB 2011).
12. See infra Part I.A for discussion of diverging development of fee-shifting exceptions between
the federal system and, by example, the California system.
13. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
14. California, Arizona, Idaho, and Utah all have ruled that fee-shifting exceptions can be judge
made. See Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 775 P.2d 521, 537 (Ariz. 1989); Serrano v. Priest, 569
P.2d 1303, 1313–14 (Cal. 1977); Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 682 P.2d 524, 531 (Idaho 1984); Stewart v. Utah
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 1994).
15. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed (Reed II), 388 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2004).
16. 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
17. Reed II, 388 F.3d at 1288.
18. 491 U.S. at 760 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)).
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position was not frivolous, it held the defendant State of Washington, but
not the defendant-intervenors, fully responsible for the fees to be paid to
19
the plaintiffs. A ruling in Perry, which is currently before the Ninth
Circuit, thus will likely adopt the Zipes standard as well. In Perry, this
could free Protectmarriage.com of liability for fees and would oblige the
State of California to pay for the defense of a law it did not support or
20
believe to be constitutional.
A 2006 California Supreme Court case suggested that the Zipes
standard might be appropriate for civil rights challenges in California
21
courts, too. Such a move would represent a sea change in California
law. Because California courts, unlike federal courts, have the power to
22
create fee-shifting exceptions to the American Rule, it would be
unnecessary for the California Supreme Court to follow the nonbinding
23
Zipes standard. The same applies to the many other states that permit
24
judge-made exceptions.
State laws enacted through the initiative process are, by design,
25
supported by private entities and not the state government. This Note
contends that it is illogical to excuse intervening initiative proponents
who take an active role in resulting civil rights challenges from bearing a
greater risk of liability for attorney’s fees when they lose. This is
especially true when the government is justified in choosing not to
defend the law. The high Zipes standard makes it unlikely that these
intervenors will be required to pay any portion of the fees. Conversely, a
rule whereby initiative proponents are almost always liable for fees if
they lose is likely to strongly discourage advocates from intervening to
defend their propositions at all, thus conflicting with the rationale behind
26
the American Rule. Such a rule also could have a chilling effect on
initiative systems as a whole.
19. 388 F.3d at 1288.
20. Beyer, supra note 6.
21. Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1, 10 n.6 (Cal. 2006).
22. Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1313 (Cal. 1977) (noting that it is within the California
Supreme Court’s “sole competence” to fashion equitable exceptions to the American Rule).
23. The Zipes decision is not binding on state courts because its holding concerned congressional
fee-shifting legislation that applies only to federal courts. See 491 U.S. at 761.
24. See supra note 14 (listing examples of states that fall into this category).
25. See What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, supra note 7 (defining the
various types of propositions).
26. See 6 Robert L. Rossi, Attorneys’ Fees § 6:1 (3d ed. 2011). The rationale behind the
American Rule
includes a number of broad policy considerations. First, since litigation is at best uncertain,
one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit. Second,
requiring each party to be responsible for its own fees is thought to encourage settlement.
Moreover, the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel. Additionally,
the litigation and proof of what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees would pose a
substantial burden for judicial administration.
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This Note proposes that the Zipes rule should not be applied in the
context of initiative litigation over civil rights, nor should the lower
27
standard that several lower federal courts used before Zipes. This Note
explores the relevant law in the federal system and, by example, the State
of California. The Note proposes the adoption of a third standard under
both federal and state law for proposition intervenors that is analogous
28
to that of the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), where the
defendant-intervenor would be liable for the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees
unless it could show that its position was substantially justified. The most
effective way to implement this rule in the federal system would be for
Congress to carve out a statutory exception for initiative litigation. But in
some states, like California, this new rule may be fashioned by the courts
or the legislature.
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I gives an overview of the
modern development of attorney’s fees law both at the federal level and
in California, and the rationales behind their diverging evolution, with a
particular focus on applicability to intervenors. Part II discusses the
context of initiative litigation, describing the treatment of attorney’s fees
in recent initiative litigation in California state courts and the current fee
issue raised in federal court in the Proposition 8 case. Part III analyzes
and critiques the potential application of the Zipes standard in the
context of initiative litigation, and the deterrent effect that a general rule
holding proponents liable would have on the state proposition system.
Seeking a middle ground, this Note then discusses the substantialjustification standard found in the EAJA and other bodies of law.
Finally, it concludes by advocating for the adoption of that standard for
intervening initiative advocates in both the federal and state systems, and
details how implementation could be accomplished at each level.

I. The Law of Attorney’s Fees for Intervenors in
Civil Rights Challenges
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that only Congress may fashion new exceptions to
the rule that litigants in federal court must pay their own attorney’s
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Huizar, 52 P.3d 816, 818 (Colo. 2002) (citations omitted).
27. See, e.g., Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1064–65 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding defendantintervenors liable for attorney’s fees because they made a “unilateral decision” to join the state
defendants in “adamantly defending” the challenged law); Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128, 132
(6th Cir. 1979) (holding a defendant-intervenor liable for fees when their position created a
“substantial barrier” to appellees’ ability to achieve their constitutional rights); Moten v. Bricklayers
Int’l Union of Am., 543 F.2d 224, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding a would-be intervenor liable for fees);
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268, 1272–75 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(holding a defendant-intervenor liable for fees because intervention was voluntary and the intervenor
litigated vigorously, causing the plaintiff to expend substantial efforts).
28. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2010); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2010); see also infra Part III.B.
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29

fees. Because that decision is not binding on the practices of state
courts, the standards for determining fee awards in some states, including
30
The standard for
California, have developed independently.
determining losing defendant-intervenors’ liability for the plaintiffs’ fees
is not settled at the federal level and has not been directly addressed in
31
California.
A. Evolution Under Federal Law
The modern federal law of attorney’s fee awards in civil rights
challenges begins with Alyeska, where the Supreme Court held that only
Congress may fashion exceptions to the American Rule for federal
32
litigation. Subsequently, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976, providing such exceptions for prevailing
33
parties in civil rights cases. Throughout the following decade, federal
34
courts’ application of that exception to intervenors was inconsistent.
The Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Zipes set forth a standard for
35
applying a statutory civil rights exception to intervenors. The federal
courts of appeals, however, have diverged on how broadly that standard
36
should be applied.
1. The Statutory Civil Rights Exception
In the U.S., the well-established American Rule requires litigants to
pay their own attorney’s fees, with the prevailing party not entitled to
collect such fees from the loser unless a contract or statute provides
37
otherwise. The English Rule, by contrast, typically provides that the
38
loser must pay the attorney’s fees of the prevailing party. Two major
exceptions to the American Rule were long recognized by courts at
39
common law: the common-benefit and bad-faith doctrines. The

29. 421 U.S. 240, 270–71 (1975).
30. See infra Part I.B.1.
31. See infra Parts I.A.3, I.B.2.
32. 421 U.S. at 270–71.
33. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2010)).
34. See infra Part I.A.2 and text accompanying notes 53–54.
35. See Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989).
36. Compare Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen., 297 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2002), with
Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed (Reed I), 343 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003); see infra Part I.A.3.
37. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 (1975); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714, 717 (1967). The rule was first announced by the Supreme Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (“The general practice of the United States is in opposition to [an award]; and
even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it
is changed, or modified, by statute.”).
38. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 (1975) (explaining that in England, attorney’s fees are regularly
awarded to the prevailing party).
39. Henry Cohen, Cong. Research Serv., 94-970, Awards of Attorneys’ Fees by Federal
Courts and Federal Agencies 1–2 (2008).
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common-benefit doctrine provides that a party who maintains a suit for
the common benefit may collect fees from those who benefit from the
40
suit, but not from the losing party. The bad-faith doctrine holds a losing
party liable for fees for punitive reasons if they have acted “vexatiously,
41
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Alyeska in 1975, some
federal courts also awarded fees under the “private attorney general
theory,” which provides that plaintiffs should be entitled to fees as a
matter of policy if they win a lawsuit bringing benefits to a broad class of
42
43
citizens. In Alyeska, the plaintiffs sought fee awards under that theory.
The Court declined to find the defendant liable for fees, refusing to
recognize the private attorney general theory as a viable common law
44
doctrine. The Court held that that only Congress, not the federal courts,
45
may create federal exceptions to the American Rule.
Congress responded to the Alyeska decision by passing the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act in order to promote the enforcement
46
of civil rights laws by private citizens. The resulting statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, provides that courts may award attorney’s fees under a variety of
47
civil rights statutes that do not already contain a fee-shifting provision.
48
Under the statute, the fees may be awarded to the prevailing party. The
prevailing-party requirement soon resulted in a different standard for
49
awarding fees to plaintiffs versus defendants, and some difficulties arose

40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 4 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)).
42. Id. at 5.
43. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 270–71.
44. Id. at 269.
45. Id. at 270–71.
46. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 346 (1980).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2010), which provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, . . . [or] title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .
Congress has proceeded to carve out fee-shifting exceptions to the American Rule in an everincreasing number of laws and subject matter areas. 1 Court Awarded Attorney Fees 1.03 (MB 2011).
48. Id.; see also 43 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2010) (discussing the application of “prevailing party”). The
Court would later hold that a plaintiff “prevails” when they are awarded relief on the merits,
modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff so that the legal
relationship between the parties is materially altered. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 (1992).
49. See Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 353–55. The Court held that successful plaintiffs are entitled to
fees unless “special circumstances” would make it unjust. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S.
400, 402 (1968). But the Court then found that the standard for whether a prevailing defendant should
be awarded fees was whether the claim against them was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation.” Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
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in determining fees when a plaintiff is successful on some, but not all, of
50
the issues.
2. Applying the Exception to Intervenors

51

Federal courts soon began to reach a range of results in holding
intervening parties liable for such fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act. In the early 1980s, several federal district court cases
held that parties intervening on behalf of defendants were liable for
attorney’s fees under § 1988 where they “placed themselves in a position
52
to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining relief” and “imposed substantial
53
costs on plaintiffs.” Other federal courts ruled differently, finding
intervenors not liable based on the fact that they did not themselves
54
obstruct the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
In the 1988 Seventh Circuit case Charles v. Daley, a group of
physicians prevailed in their civil rights challenge against an Illinois state
55
law regulating abortion. Another group of doctors that supported the
law intervened to defend the rights of patients as well as their own
56
interests. The plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees against the defendant57
intervenors. In response, the defendant-intervenors raised a First
Amendment claim, arguing that holding them liable for attorney’s fees
would violate their “right to participate in litigation as a means of
58
political expression” and their “fundamental freedoms of association
59
and expression.”
The Charles court rejected the free speech argument, holding that
litigation goes beyond speech and that there is an expectation that

50. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing
parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in the suit.” (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79
(1st Cir. 1978))).
51. This Note discusses “intervenors” in reference to parties who have entered litigation in
federal courts under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In California courts,
intervention is provided for under section 387 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
52. Vulcan Soc’y of Westchester Cnty., Inc. v. Fire Dep’t of White Plains, 533 F. Supp. 1054, 1062
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
53. See, e.g., May v. Cooperman, 578 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D.N.J. 1984), aff’d in part, dismissed in
part, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985). See generally Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1979);
Moten v. Bricklayers Int’l Union of Am., 543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Decker v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 564 F.
Supp. 1273 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
54. See, e.g., Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 524 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
55. 846 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1988).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1060.
58. Id. at 1061.
59. Id. at 1074.
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60

litigation will be costly. The court explained that even though the
intervenors themselves did not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights,
61
they would nevertheless be held liable for attorney’s fees under § 1988.
The court noted that the intervenors had made a “unilateral decision” to
join the state defendants in “adamantly defending” the state abortion
62
law, and thus could be considered full-fledged parties to the suit. The
court found that, because nothing in § 1988 exempted specific classes of
defendants from fee liability, holding intervenors liable would be
consistent with Congress’s intent to provide awards as incentives for civil
63
rights plaintiffs.
64
Two years later, in Zipes, a group of employees brought a sex
discrimination action in the Northern District of Illinois against a
commercial airline under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
65
provides for the award of fees to the prevailing party. The intervenor
was a union representing current employees of the airline who opposed
the terms of the settlement between the parties under the employees’
66
own contractual rights. The intervenor brought an affirmative Title VII
67
claim of its own, which the trial court rejected. The plaintiffs then
68
petitioned for attorney’s fees against the intervenor.
Zipes set a landmark standard under which intervenors could be
held liable for attorney’s fees in a civil rights action. The Supreme Court
reasoned that assessing fees against “blameless” intervenors was not
essential to Congress’s purpose, which was to encourage victims of
69
discrimination to pursue legal action. The opinion also considered that
intervention, when pursued in good faith, is not a method of prolonging
70
litigation, but rather protecting the intervenor’s own rights. The Court
decided that the same standard it had previously established in
Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
71
Commission for holding losing plaintiffs liable for fees should be
72
applied to the intervenor in Zipes. Thus, the Court explained, an
intervenor would be liable for fees only where its own actions were

60. Id. at 1075.
61. Id. at 1077.
62. Id. at 1064.
63. Id. at 1063–64.
64. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
65. Id. at 757–58. The Court had previously stated that all fee-shifting statutes would be treated
alike; thus the Zipes holding applies to § 1988 fees as well. Id. at 758 n.2.
66. Id. at 757.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 757–58.
69. Id. at 761.
70. Id. at 765.
71. 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978).
72. Zipes, 491 U.S. at 761.
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73

“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” The Court remanded
74
the case to the lower court to make that determination. Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, arguing that the
majority’s suggestion that all intervenors should be treated like civil
75
rights plaintiffs was contrary to the language and objectives of Title VII.
Justice Marshall cited the then-recent Charles case as an example of a
situation where an intervenor’s sole purpose in the litigation was to
defend the challenged law, and argued that intervenors, therefore, should
76
be held to a different standard for attorney’s fee liability.
3. The Reach of the Frivolousness Standard: Circuit Courts Split
The Zipes holding has been criticized for treating intervenors the
77
same as civil rights plaintiffs. Critics note that intervenors do not
necessarily behave like plaintiffs and bring their own civil rights claims,
78
as the union did in Zipes. These arguments assume that under Zipes the
frivolousness standard applies to all intervenors, not only to intervenors
bringing their own affirmative civil rights claims. This view also assumes
that Zipes abrogated the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Charles, in which
the defendant-intervenor was held liable for fees without a finding that
79
its position was frivolous. And indeed, although the facts of Zipes
involved an intervenor who was acting as a plaintiff, the language of the
Court’s holding was broad:
[W]e conclude that district courts should . . . award Title VII attorney’s
fees against losing intervenors only where the intervenors’ action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. . . . In every lawsuit in
which there is a prevailing Title VII plaintiff there will also be a losing
defendant who has committed a legal wrong. That defendant will . . . be
80
liable for all of the fees . . . .

Some courts have gone further, interpreting Zipes to extend to
“prevailing parties’ request[s] for intervention-related attorneys’ fees

73. Id. at 766.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 775, 778. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 778 n.8 (“When [intervenors] . . . voluntarily intervene, they benefit from ‘their ability to
affect the course and substance of the litigation,’ and thus should ‘fairly be charged with the
consequences,’ including the risk of attorney’s fees.” (quoting Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1067
(7th Cir. 1988))).
77. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen., 297 F.3d 253, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2002); see
also Zipes, 491 U.S. at 778 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Cynthia G. Thomas, Note, Defendant-Intervenors’
Liability for Attorneys’ Fees in Civil Rights Litigation: A Standing Requirement for Functional
Plaintiffs, 35 Wayne L. Rev. 1499, 1515–16 (1989).
78. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 77, at 1515–16.
79. Brief for Petitioner at 31 n.13, Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2006) (No.
S125502), 2004 WL 2863084.
80. 491 U.S. at 761.

Slevin_63-HLJ-860 (Do Not Delete)

878

3/26/2012 5:34 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:867

81

from the losing defendant.” Advocates of a broad view of Zipes have
also argued that even if Charles is still good law, it applies only to
defendant-intervenors with a “direct, financial and personal interest in
82
the underlying litigation.”
Subscribing to the interpretation that Zipes applies to all
intervenors, the Ninth Circuit applied the frivolousness standard to civil
83
There, the Democratic,
rights defendant-intervenors in Reed.
Republican, and Libertarian parties successfully challenged the State of
84
Washington’s “blanket primary” law on civil rights grounds. The
85
Washington Secretary of State defended the law in his official capacity.
The plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees on appeal under § 1988 against
both the Secretary of State and the defendant-intervenor, a nonprofit
86
organization that defended the challenged law. The court reasoned that
although the intervenor’s arguments caused the plaintiffs to spend extra
87
time on the case, that fact alone did not warrant an award against them.
The court then expressly relied on Zipes to say that all intervenors in
civil rights cases should be held liable for fees only if their position was
88
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Accordingly, the
court ordered the state to pay the attorney’s fees award in full and did
89
not find the intervenors liable.
But the law is unsettled on how broadly the Supreme Court
intended Zipes to apply. Since Zipes was published, courts have
90
questioned whether Zipes and Charles can be reconciled. Several courts
have held that Zipes created a far more limited rule. The Seventh Circuit,
while never having expressly applied its holding in Charles, has
continued to cite the case post-Zipes, examining it in a 2005 decision
91
awarding fees to a prevailing defendant-intervenor. In Planned

81. Gratz v. Bollinger, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929, 940 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing Rum Creek Coal Sales,
Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 176–78 (4th Cir. 1994); Bigby v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 1426, 1428–29
(7th Cir. 1991)).
82. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 79, at 31 n.13.
83. Reed II, 388 F.3d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 2004).
84. Id. at 1284. Under the “blanket primary” law, Washington voters were not restricted to voting
for candidates of a particular political party. Reed I, 343 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The parties all
challenged the law, claiming it restrained their supporters’ freedom of association. Id.
85. Reed II, 388 F.3d at 1282.
86. See id. at 1288.
87. Id.
88. Id. (The court acknowledged that while Zipes dealt with an action under Title VII, it could
not find any reason why the Zipes holding should not extend to § 1988).
89. Id.
90. See United States v. City of S.F., 132 F.R.D. 533, 537 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Davis v.
City of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.
1993) (discussing the significance of the Supreme Court’s Zipes decision in tandem with its earlier
denial of the writ of certiorari in Charles).
91. King v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 410 F.3d 404, 412–13, 421–23 (7th Cir. 2005) (considering an
attorney’s fees award against the plaintiff in favor of a prevailing defendant-intervenor).
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Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit
quoted a case from the District of New Jersey that considered fees
against defendant-intervenors in a civil rights case, expressing “serious
doubts” about Zipes’ applicability:
In Zipes, the Supreme Court reasoned that the intervenors were
completely “blameless,” having had no part in the constitutional
violation of which plaintiffs complained, and intervened only to protect
their own rights . . . . Moreover, the Court reasoned that there were
present in the action “guilty” defendants, who would be liable, in any
event, for the counsel fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs. [The court]
question[s] the defendants-intervenors’ qualifications as “blameless”
intervenors, in light of the vigorous battle fought defending an
unconstitutional statute, and, in addition, cannot ignore the absence in
this case of a “guilty” defendant who otherwise would be liable for these
92
fees.

The Third Circuit also quoted the Southern District of Florida,
which took a similar position in awarding fees against a defendantintervenor, based on a finding that the Zipes frivolousness standard
93
should be applied only when the intervenor was “innocent.” The
Florida case held that Zipes should not apply when “[the intervenor]
entered the case early in the proceedings and vigorously defended the
94
constitutionality of the statute throughout the entire proceeding.” In
adopting this reasoning, the Third Circuit opined that an application of
Zipes to cases where defendant-intervenors vigorously defended against
a successful civil rights challenge would “thwart the purpose of the fee95
shifting statutes.”
The view that Charles is still good law is further supported by the
fact that the Supreme Court was aware of the Seventh Circuit’s thenrecent Charles ruling when deciding Zipes. This is evident in Justice
Marshall’s dissent, in which he cited Charles in arguing that intervenors
not affirmatively asserting their own civil rights claim should have to take
96
the risk of liability for attorney’s fees. The majority, however, did not
respond to Justice Marshall on this point or cite Charles in its opinion.
The absence of any reference to Charles from the majority’s analysis
suggests the two cases could be read together.

92. 297 F.3d 253, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Daggett v. Kimmelman, Nos. 82–297, 82–388,
1989 WL 120742, at *7 n.6 (D.N.J. July 18, 1989)).
93. Id. at 264 (quoting Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d, 109
F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 1997)).
94. Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
95. Planned Parenthood, 297 F.3d at 265.
96. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 778 n.8 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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B. Attorney’s Fees Under California Law
97

California, like several other states, has followed a different path in
its development of attorney’s fees law over the past few decades, as state
98
courts are not bound by the federal court decisions just discussed. For
example, the California Supreme Court has expressly rejected the
Alyeska doctrine and ruled that judges may create fee-shifting exceptions
99
for California courts. California courts have proceeded to develop those
100
exceptions through case law in the decades since. But in 2006, the
California Supreme Court implied that it might implement the Zipes
101
standard for defendant-intervenors.
1. A History of Independent, Judge-Made Exceptions
Two years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1975 Alyeska ruling, the
California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Serrano v. Priest, in which
the prevailing plaintiff moved for an award of attorney’s fees under the
same common law doctrine that Alyeska had recently rejected: the
102
The plaintiffs in Serrano had
private attorney general theory.
succeeded in a constitutional claim regarding the state public school
103
financing system. They asked the state court to use its equitable powers
104
to fashion a judicial exception to the American Rule. In its resulting
opinion, the California Supreme Court expressly rejected the Alyeska
holding that statutory authorization was needed for courts to recognize a
105
private attorney general theory and affirmed the award of attorney’s
106
fees to the plaintiffs under such a theory. Besides allowing for relief
107
under the private attorney general theory as a common law doctrine,

97. See supra note 14.
98. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 569 P.2d 1303, 1312 (Cal. 1977).
99. Id.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 102–07.
101. See Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1, 10 n.6 (Cal. 2006); discussion infra Part I.B.2.
102. 569 P.2d at 1312.
103. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 557 P.2d 929, 958 (Cal. 1976).
104. Serrano II, 569 P.2d at 1306–1307. In California, the American Rule is codified at California
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021, which provides:
Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of
compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or
implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as
hereinafter provided.
105. Serrano II, 569 P.2d at 1316.
106. Id. at 1313.
107. The California legislature subsequently codified the private attorney general theory. See Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 (2010) (“Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful
party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest [if certain requirements are met].”).
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the Serrano court held that it was in its “sole competence” to fashion
108
equitable exceptions to the state’s codification of the American Rule.
The California Supreme Court has continued on this trajectory by
using its power to approve additional fee-shifting exceptions. In 1983, the
court approved the “catalyst” theory for awarding attorney’s fees to a
109
plaintiff. Under this theory, a court can award attorney’s fees even
when the litigation does not result in a decision from the court, so long as
the litigation provides the primary relief sought, thereby causing the
110
defendant to substantially change its behavior. More recently, the court
refined its interpretation of this doctrine in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., holding that liability for fees is warranted only if the underlying
lawsuit had merit and the plaintiff engaged in a reasonable attempt to
111
settle before commencing litigation. In doing so, the California court
again refused to follow the U.S. Supreme Court, which recently had
112
rejected the catalyst theory. In Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los
Angeles, a companion case to Graham that was decided on the same day,
the California Supreme Court, at the request of the Ninth Circuit,
provided a three-part test for what a plaintiff must show to obtain fees
113
under the state’s version of the doctrine.
The California Supreme Court has used this power to create other
exceptions to the American Rule in specific areas of the law. For
example, in Brandt v. Superior Court, it held that attorney’s fees are
recoverable from an insurance company that breaches its duty of good
114
faith by unfairly withholding benefits. Also, California has adopted a
more lenient standard than the U.S. Supreme Court on the issue of
enhancement of attorney’s fees due to the attorney’s superior
115
performance.

108. Serrano II, 569 P.2d at 1313.
109. Westside Cmty. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 657 P.2d 365, 367 (Cal. 1983). While
affirming the doctrine, the court denied fees under the catalyst theory because it found no causal
connection between the litigation and defendant’s change in behavior. Id. at 368.
110. Id. at 367. As the court noted, some federal courts at that point had used the same reasoning
to award fees under federal fee-shifting statutes. Id. (citing, inter alia, Sullivan v. Pa. Dep’t of Labor &
Indus., 663 F.2d 443, 465 (3d Cir. 1981)).
111. 101 P.3d 140, 144 (Cal. 2004).
112. Id. at 147–56 (examining Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 622 (2001)).
113. 101 P.3d 174, 177 (Cal. 2004) (“[A] plaintiff must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst
motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) that the lawsuit had merit and
achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense . . . and,
(3) that the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit.”).
114. 693 P.2d 796, 800 (Cal. 1985).
115. Compare Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1674 (2010) (holding that an
enhancement of fees due to exceptional performance should be allowed only in “rare” and
“exceptional” circumstances), with Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 746 (Cal. 2001) (affirming a fee
enhancement due to exceptional performance based on counsel’s documentation).
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2. The California Supreme Court Might Follow the Federal Case
Law
After spending years carving its own path in the many areas of
attorney’s fees law, the California Supreme Court has suggested that it
may follow federal standards for civil rights defendant-intervenors. In the
2006 case Connerly v. State Personnel Board, that court considered a
plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees against amici curiae under the
116
private attorney general theory. In the underlying litigation, the
plaintiff had prevailed in a civil rights challenge to portions of a
California statutory scheme that provided for affirmative action
117
programs for state agencies. In the suit, the state agencies named as
defendants had opted not to defend the statutes, and instead various
amici curiae advocacy groups that supported affirmative action were
118
designated as real parties in interest. The trial court then awarded
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff under the private attorney general theory,
to be paid by the state agencies and only one of the advocacy groups, the
California Business Council, with the agencies collectively owing five119
120
sixths of the award. The Court of Appeal upheld the award.
The California Supreme Court held that the advocacy group was not
liable for fees because, although the group had actively participated in
the litigation as a real party in interest, as amici they did not have a direct
interest in the litigation and were not even partly responsible for the
121
statutory policy that had given rise to the litigation. The court reasoned
that it did not want to construe the California fee-shifting statute in a way
122
that would discourage amici curiae participation. The court further
justified holding the state agencies liable for fees by noting that the state
had the exclusive power to abandon or change the challenged law, but
123
had declined to do so.
In a footnote, the Connerly court acknowledged that both parties
124
had cited Zipes and Charles as persuasive authority. The defending
advocacy group had argued that the Zipes standard should be adopted in
125
California to apply to amici, while the plaintiff relied on Charles. The
court dismissed both cases as inapplicable, explaining that each dealt

116. 129 P.3d 1, 2 (Cal. 2006).
117. Id. The statutory scheme was invalidated as unconstitutional under article I, section 31 of the
California Constitution, a proposition-enacted 1996 amendment that outlawed such programs. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 9–10.
122. Id. at 9.
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id. at 10 n.6.
125. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 79, at 29–34; Brief for Respondent at 28–33, Connerly, 129
P.3d 1 (No. S125502), 2004 WL 3256433.
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126

with intervening parties, not amici curiae. The question of which
standard applies to defendant-intervenors in California was thus left
127
undecided. Significant to the discussion here is the fact that by noting
this, the court left open the question of whether it would be willing to
adopt the Zipes or Charles rules as persuasive authority in the future.

II. The Context of Initiative Litigation
In twenty-four states and the District of Columbia, citizens may
128
introduce ballot initiatives. When the state declines to defend enacted
initiatives against civil rights challenges and initiative proponents
intervene as defendants and lose, it raises the issue of whether the
proponent or the state should pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. An
ongoing line of cases in state and federal court, concerning challenges to
California initiatives banning same-sex marriage, are illustrative.
A. Non-Intervenor Initiative Proponents Found Liable in
California
A 2009 decision suggests that California state courts might be
willing to find intervening initiative proponents liable for fees. The
California Court of Appeal held in In re Marriage Cases that an initiative
proponent who was not an intervenor was liable for fees after the law it
129
defended was struck down on civil rights grounds. The underlying
130
litigation concerned Proposition 22 and had begun when the initiative’s
official proponent, Campaign for California Families, filed suit against
the City of San Francisco under the enacted statute to prohibit the city
131
from issuing same-sex marriage licenses. The proponent prevailed at
the California Supreme Court, which issued a writ of mandate
compelling the city to comply with the statute absent a judicial
132
determination that Proposition 22 was unconstitutional. That suit was
then consolidated in an action before the California Supreme Court in
2008 to determine the validity of Proposition 22 under the state
133
constitution. The proponent, however, was not granted standing in the
constitutional challenge, and thus only participated as amicus curiae at

126. Connerly, 129 P.3d at 10 n.6.
127. Id.
128. See What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, supra note 7.
129. No. A123634, 2009 WL 2515727, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2009).
130. Prior to Proposition 8, Proposition 22 created a statute banning same-sex marriage in California.
See Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5, invalidated by In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
131. Lockyer v. City of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 462–63 (Cal. 2004).
132. Id. at 492, 499.
133. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
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134

that stage. The California Supreme Court then held that Proposition 22
135
was unconstitutional.
On remand to determine payment of attorney’s fees, the California
Court of Appeal wrote an unpublished decision awarding fees to the
136
prevailing plaintiffs against the initiative proponent. Asserting that it
should not be liable for the fees, the proponent in In re Marriage Cases
argued that it was amicus curiae and thus, under Connerly, attorney’s
137
fees liability was precluded. The court disagreed, explaining that
although the proponent served as amicus curiae in the constitutional
challenge, it should be treated as a party for the purpose of attorney’s
fees liability because it originally brought its own suit, which had
138
instigated the entire litigation. The court went on to explain that the
proponent “chose an active role in the litigation on its own and not at the
invitation of the court or opposing parties. . . . [It] steadfastly argued at
every level that it had standing to sue as a party and refused to
139
The court concluded that the
participate solely as an amicus.”
140
proponent was liable for a portion of the attorney’s fees.
The proponent in In re Marriage Cases was not an intervenor and, as
the court noted, “[t]here was no lack of adversity . . . that required [it] to
141
step in.” The court’s determination regarding fees is unpublished and
thus does not serve as precedent. But the court’s reasoning could be read
to suggest that California courts might be inclined to hold an intervening
proponent liable for fees when it has taken an active role in the litigation
beyond that of amicus curiae.
B. PERRY V. BROWN: The Proposition 8 Proponent’s Argument
The highly publicized Perry v. Brown litigation (originally named
Perry v. Schwarzenegger) is currently progressing through the federal
142
courts. In Perry, the plaintiffs, two same-sex couples, brought a federal

134. Id. at 406. The Campaign was precluded from seeking relief in In re Marriage Cases due to the
stay the California Supreme Court previously granted in its favor in Lockyer. Id.
135. Id. at 452.
136. In re Marriage Cases, No. A123634, 2009 WL 2515727 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2009).
Unpublished opinions “must not be cited or relied on” under California Rule of Court 8.1115 (2011).
137. In re Marriage Cases, 2009 WL 2515727, at *3.
138. Id. at *7.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. At that point, the State of California was defending the ban on same-sex marriage.
142. See supra note 3. At the time of this writing, the Ninth Circuit has issued its decision
affirming, on different grounds, the district court finding that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. Perry
IV, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). The district court had held
that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it denies same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry. Perry I, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The Ninth Circuit did not reach that issue, instead holding more
narrowly that Proposition 8 violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it withdrew a right that was
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constitutional challenge in the Northern District of California to the state
143
constitutional amendment created by Proposition 8. Proposition 8
provides, “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
144
recognized in California.” The plaintiffs alleged that Proposition 8
deprives them of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth
145
Amendment. In their action, the plaintiffs named as defendants the
Governor, Attorney General, several other state government officers,
146
and two county clerks in their official capacities. The Attorney General
conceded that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, and the other named
147
officials refused to take a position on the merits of the claims.
Protectmarriage.com, the official proponent of Proposition 8, intervened
in the federal case to defend the proposition in the state’s absence, and
148
did so vigorously through the trial proceedings. The district court found
for the plaintiffs, ruling Proposition 8 unconstitutional, and entered a
149
permanent injunction against its enforcement. Protectmarriage.com
then filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The state officials did not join
150
in the appeal. The Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending the
151
appeal.
The plaintiffs then filed a motion at the district court to extend the
fourteen-day statutory deadline to file their motion for attorney’s fees
152
and costs. In their opposition, Protectmarriage.com argued that it
should not be held liable for attorney’s fees, citing as controlling Ninth
Circuit precedent Reed’s holding that all intervenors in civil rights cases
153
should be subject to the Zipes frivolousness standard. In the ensuing
order, the district court ruled that “any motion for fees and costs” would
154
not be decided until “all appeals from the judgment are final.” In

previously held by same-sex couples in California. Perry IV, 2012 WL 372713, at *1–2. The Ninth
Circuit also held that the defendant-intervenor in the case had standing to appeal. Id. at *7.
143. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The case was filed immediately after the
California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 under state law, see Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48,
122 (Cal. 2009).
144. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 928.
147. Id. The Attorney General at the time was Jerry Brown, who was later sworn in as Governor
in January 2011. Anthony York, The Brown Inauguration: Difficult Choices in a New Era, L.A. Times,
Jan. 4, 2011, at 10.
148. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
149. Id. at 1003–04.
150. Perry II, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011), certified question answered sub nom. Perry III, 265
P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011).
151. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
152. Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion to Enlarge Time to File a Bill of Costs, Perry I,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. 09-CV-2292).
153. Defendant-Intervenors Opposition to Motion to Enlarge Time at 2, Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (No. 09-CV-2292).
154. Order, Perry I, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010). Chief Judge Vaughn Walker, who

Slevin_63-HLJ-860 (Do Not Delete)

886

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/26/2012 5:34 PM

[Vol. 63:867

February 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, on different grounds, that
155
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. Still, pending an appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, presumably the attorney’s fees issue will not be decided
156
for “at least months and possibly years.”

III. Finding a Different Standard
Zipes created a high standard for finding an intervenor liable for
attorney’s fees. This creates a likelihood that initiative proponent
intervenors who lose will not be made liable for the civil rights plaintiff’s
fees. This is unfair, especially in cases like Perry where the state does not
defend the law at all. Fortunately, a more appropriate standard for
determining attorney’s fees liability exists elsewhere in the law. This
standard, found in a federal statutory scheme creating a fee-shifting
exception for suits against the federal government, should be applied to
defendant-intervenors in initiative litigation.
A. The Problem
The Ninth Circuit’s Reed decision suggests that the court is willing
to apply the Zipes standard in any constitutional challenge where the
157
prevailing plaintiff moves for fees against a defendant-intervenor. The
California Supreme Court’s footnote distinguishing Zipes in Connerly
158
signaled that it too might use that standard when the facts are similar.
But in litigation arising from a ballot initiative, this is unjustified. State
laws enacted via initiative are generated, advocated for, and placed on
159
the ballot by private entities, not the state government. It is unfair for
defendant-intervenors in initiative litigation to be subject to the cost of
the successful challenger’s attorney’s fees only if the high Zipes standard
is met. Such a practice would mean that the state would be liable for all
attorney’s fees unless the initiative proponent’s position was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. In a case like Perry, where the state
has chosen not to defend the proposition and the proponents are the only
defendants, such a low risk for fee liability to those proponents is
unreasonable.

issued the order, has since retired. See Bob Egelko, Judge Who Struck Down Prop. 8 to Retire, S.F.
Chron., Sept. 30, 2010, at C-1. Thus, a different judge in the Northern District of California will
ultimately decide the issue.
155. Perry IV, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). The court
also held that Protectmarriage.com had standing to bring the appeal on behalf of the state. Id. at *7.
156. Beyer, supra note 6 (making this prediction in September 2010).
157. See supra Part I.A.3.
158. See Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1, 10 n.6 (Cal. 2006).
159. See What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, supra note 7 (defining the
various types of propositions).
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Arguably, Zipes need not be applied to defendant-intervenors at all.
As discussed previously, the standard may be appropriately applied only
160
to plaintiff-intervenors, not all intervenors. The reasoning in Zipes
turned on the fact that the intervenor in that case brought its own cause
of action in good faith and was interested in protecting its own civil
161
rights. The Supreme Court treated the Zipes intervenor as a plaintiff,
which is why it imported the Christianburg rule that had been created for
162
actual plaintiffs. It should follow, as Justice Marshall argued in his
Zipes dissent, that defendant-intervenors who instead take a defending
position that the challenged law does not violate the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights should not be put in the same category as the Zipes
163
intervenors. This interpretation could be adopted in California, where
the Zipes rule is not controlling and where the courts have taken an
independent path in creating fee-shifting jurisprudence. The California
Supreme Court could either read Zipes narrowly or expressly reject its
164
holding, just as it did with Alyeska.
But, as discussed, in the past twenty years Zipes often has been read
165
more broadly. That interpretation is grounded in the broadly worded
166
holding as well as other language in the opinion, which states that the
fact that “an intervenor can advance the same argument as a defendant
does not mean that the two must be treated alike for purposes of fee
167
assessments.” The Ninth Circuit, having adopted Zipes for a defendant168
intervenor in Reed, would have to overrule or distinguish Reed to adopt
such a narrow interpretation of Zipes.
Even if courts continue to interpret Zipes to apply to defendantintervenors, as in Reed, an exception is appropriate for initiative
litigation. The argument that intervenors should not be liable for fees
often focuses on the fact that they themselves did not violate the

160. See supra Part I.A.2.
161. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 762 (1989) (“[The intervenor
entered the lawsuit] not because it bore any responsibility for the practice alleged to have violated
Title VII, but because it sought to protect the bargained-for seniority rights of its employees.”).
162. See id. at 765.
163. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen., 297 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2002)
(asserting that an application of Zipes to cases where defendant-intervenors vigorously defend against
a successful civil rights challenge “would thwart the purpose of the fee-shifting statutes”); see also
Zipes, 491 U.S. at 778 (Marshall, J., dissenting); supra Part I.A.2.
164. See Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 101 P.3d 140, 154 (Cal. 2004) (rejecting the reasoning
of Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598
(2001)); Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1316 (Cal. 1977) (rejecting the reasoning of Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)); see also discussion supra Part I.B.1.
165. See supra Part I.A.2.
166. See Zipes, 491 U.S. at 761; supra Part I.A.3.
167. Zipes, 491 U.S. at 765.
168. Reed II, 388 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2004).
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plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. That was true in Zipes, where the court
emphasized the need for a “crucial connection between liability for
violation of federal law and liability for attorney’s fees under federal fee170
shifting statutes.” That was also true in Reed, where the challenged law
had been in place for over seventy years, and the defendant-intervenors
171
were a nonprofit organization that now supported it. And that fact was
172
also acknowledged in Charles, where fees were granted anyway.
But in initiative litigation, where the losing defendant-intervenors
are the initiative’s proponents, they have in fact contributed to the
violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, albeit indirectly. Even
though only the state can grant court-ordered relief, and the violation
results from the state’s enforcement of the enacted law, the defendantintervenors’ action is the root of the violation; the enactment and
enforcement of an initiative results from the proponent and the state
working in tandem. Thus, unlike many defendant-intervenors, who as in
Charles or Reed are merely advocacy groups that support the challenged
law, initiative proponents are more like true defendants.
Indeed, proponents who intervene to defend the law take an active
role in the litigation beyond that of amicus curiae. Proponents that
choose to take that extra step should be given different treatment. The
California Court of Appeal’s logic in holding the proponent of
173
Proposition 22 liable for fees is illustrative. The proponent in that case
was a party, not an intervenor, and thus the court did not need to
consider an application of the Zipes standard. But the court grounded its
reasoning in the fact that the proponent had chosen to become an active
party in the litigation, having brought the original suit as a plaintiff and
thus took on a role that differed significantly from that of the many amici
174
curiae who also participated. The same rationale justifies holding
proponents liable for attorney’s fees when they take on a similarly active
role as intervenors. In Perry, for example, Protectmarriage.com
participated fully in the litigation, putting on a full defense with its own
175
witnesses, because the state put on no defense whatsoever.
An extreme solution would treat initiative advocates who have
intervened and effectively stepped fully into the shoes of the absent state
defendants as regular defendants when it comes to the assessment of

169. See, e.g., Zipes, 491 U.S. at 761 (calling the intervenors “blameless”); Charles v. Daley, 846
F.2d 1057, 1064 (7th Cir. 1988).
170. 491 U.S. at 762.
171. Reed II, 388 F.3d at 1284.
172. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1077.
173. See In re Marriage Cases, No. A123634, 2009 WL 2515727, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18,
2009); supra Part II.A.
174. In re Marriage Cases, 2009 WL 2515727, at *7.
175. See Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 944–52 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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176

fees. In that scenario, the defendant-intervenors would be held fully
liable for fees under the relevant fee-shifting statute as if they were the
state. However, a policy holding initiative proponents always liable by
law for fees is likely to be met with valid objections. A clear-cut rule
could have a chilling effect on initiative proponents’ willingness to
177
defend their adopted law in court. That policy also would seem to
thwart the basic policy behind the American Rule, which is to keep from
discouraging litigation by imposing a requirement to pay the opposing
178
party’s attorney’s fees. Second, one could raise the argument, made in
Charles, that assessing fees against defendant-intervenors infringes on
their association and expression rights. Advocates would be strongly
discouraged from defending their initiatives, given the risk that they
would be responsible for attorney’s fees if they lose. While this argument
was rejected in Charles when applied to an advocacy group, it is more
likely to be accepted in initiative litigation, where the initiative
proponent’s vigorous defense of the enacted law is an extension or
179
continuation of their political expression in championing it.
In Perry v. Brown, the defendant-intervenor, Protectmarriage.com,
is the official proponent responsible for placing Proposition 8 on the
ballot, and the State of California has taken the position that the law is
unconstitutional and has refused from the start of the federal litigation to
180
defend it. If the challengers to Proposition 8 prevail, and the Northern
District, Ninth Circuit, or U.S. Supreme Court applies the Zipes standard
in assessing fees, it is more than likely that the State of California will
shoulder the full cost of attorney’s fees for the lengthy litigation, unless
Protectmarriage.com’s position is found to be “frivolous, unreasonable,
181
That is because, besides the fact that
or without foundation.”

176. Such a treatment of Protectmarriage.com is not out of the question, given the Ninth Circuit’s
and the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in holding that Protectmarriage.com has Article III
standing to appeal the district court’s judgment. See Perry IV, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL
372713, at *10 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (“When the Attorney General of California . . . defend[s] the
validity of a state statute . . . she stands in the shoes of the State to assert its interests in
litigation. . . . The same is true of Proponents here . . . .”); see also Perry III, 265 P.3d 1002, 1023 (Cal.
2011) (“[T]he role played by the proponents in [initiative] litigation is comparable to the role
ordinarily played by the Attorney General or other public officials in vigorously defending a duly
enacted state law and raising all arguable legal theories upon which a challenged provision may be
sustained.”).
177. When costs for obtaining signatures and campaigning for a ballot initiative are very expensive,
the added burden of ultimately paying plaintiff’s attorney’s fees may not always have a strong
deterrent effect. In the case of Proposition 8, campaign contributions for the initiative totaled
approximately $40 million (and campaign contributions against Proposition 8 totaled $43 million).
Jesse McKinley, California Releasing Donor List for $83 Million Marriage Vote, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3,
2009, at A13.
178. See Rossi, supra note 26, § 6:1.
179. See McKinley, supra note 177.
180. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
181. However, it is certainly possible. The district court in Perry I found that Proposition 8
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Proposition 8 was supported and voted on by millions of Californians,
the stance that marriage should be defined as a union between a man and
183
a woman has significant support throughout in the U.S.
For these reasons, the Zipes standard is inappropriate for Perry.
Protectmarriage.com is not asserting its own affirmative civil rights claim
like the intervenor was in Zipes. And although the constitutional rights
violation created by Proposition 8 would have been caused directly by
California’s enforcement of the law, and only the state would be able to
provide relief, it can hardly be said that Protectmarriage.com was
blameless in causing the violation. And just like the proponent of
184
Proposition 22 in In re Marriage Cases, which was held liable for fees,
Protectmarriage.com chose to go beyond mere participation as amicus
curiae and take an active role in the Perry litigation. However, treating
Protectmarriage.com as a full defendant, subject by law to fee-shifting
statutes, could have an undue chilling effect on California’s initiative and

“fail[ed] to possess even a rational basis.” See id. at 997. In rejecting each of Protectmarriage.com’s
rationales, the court remarked that they were “nothing more than a fear or unarticulated dislike of
same-sex couples” and “post-hoc justifications.” Id. at 1002. The Ninth Circuit found that
“Proposition 8 serves no purpose, and has no effect, other than to lessen the status and human dignity
of gays and lesbians in California.” Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7,
2012). It also found that “Proposition 8 is not rationally related . . . to either of [the] purported
interests” advanced by the defendant-intervenors. Id. at *20. Given this harsh treatment of
Protectmarriage.com’s arguments, a finding that its position falls below the Zipes standard is not
inconceivable. Still, the fact that the Ninth Circuit panel ruling was 2–1 signals that a finding of
frivolousness is not the most likely outcome. See id. at *29–45 (Smith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
182. Beyer, supra note 6 (“[Protectmarriage.com] lost decisively [at the district court], yes, but I
don’t think you can say that what they did was frivolous or without foundation . . . . They defended a
proposition that was voted on by seven million plus voters in California.” (quoting Professor David
Levine)).
183. The most prominent and current example is the litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”), the federal law passed in 1996 that defines marriage as “a legal union between one man
and one woman.” See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010). DOMA has been defended in numerous court challenges
since its passage, notably being held unconstitutional in the District of Massachusetts. See Gill v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA is a violation of
the Fifth Amendment); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234,
253 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment). Several other challenges
to DOMA are pending in the federal courts at the time of this writing. The Department of Justice had
previously defended the law. In February 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter to the
House of Representatives, explaining that the Department of Justice will cease to defend the statute in
constitutional challenges based on his and President Obama’s determination that it is unconstitutional.
See Jerry Markon and Sandhya Somashekhar, In Gay Rights Victory, Obama Administration Won’t
Defend Defense of Marriage Act, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1. The House of Representatives has
since taken up defending DOMA in court. Felicia Sonmez, House to Defend the Defense of Marriage
Act in Court, Wash. Post (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/03/09/AR2011030906188.html.
184. See In re Marriage Cases, No. A123634, 2009 WL 2515727, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18,
2009); supra Part II.A.
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referendum process by deterring proponents who wish to defend laws
185
approved by the voters.
In sum, even if Zipes were meant to apply to ordinary defendantintervenors, an exception of some kind should be made for initiative
litigation both in California and at the federal level. Given the competing
policy interests, it is not fair to assess fees against losing intervening
initiative proponents only if their position was “frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation,” nor does it make sense to assess fees against
them as a matter of course. This is because the proponents have
contributed to the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
whether the state joins them in defending the law in court, or steps out of
the picture like in Perry. Therefore, finding a new, middle-ground
standard for assessing fees against those proponents is appropriate.
B. A Middle Ground: The Substantial-Justification Standard
A standard that exists elsewhere in attorney’s fees law, both in
federal and state statutory schemes, could be the answer. The Equal
186
Access to Justice Act provides a standard for attorney’s fees to be
187
awarded to eligible plaintiffs against the federal government. The
EAJA widened the scope of claims for which fees could be awarded
188
beyond those dealing with civil rights. Its effect was to supplement, not
189
supersede, the federal fee-shifting statutes already in existence. The
EAJA provides that a court must award fees to any party who prevails in
a non-tort civil action against the federal government, “unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or
190
that special circumstances make an award unjust.”
The EAJA had three objectives: to give private citizens an incentive
to challenge government wrongdoing, to deter such wrongdoing, and to
191
provide better compensation for the injured plaintiffs. On the other
hand, Congress did not want potential fee liability to have a chilling

185. See Perry III, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (2011) (“[T]he initiative and referendum
[process] . . . articulat[es] ‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic process.’” (quoting
Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal.
1976))).
186. Congress first passed the Act in 1980 as temporary program, which lapsed in 1984. Equal
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325, 2327 (1980). In 1985, the Act was reenacted as
a permanent statute. Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985).
187. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2010) (applying to administrative proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2010)
(providing for court proceedings).
188. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2010).
189. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of
Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 La. L. Rev. 217, 251 (1994).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2010).
191. Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act—A Qualified Success,
11 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 458, 458 (1993).
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effect on government action. Therefore, instead of requiring mandatory
fees from the government, Congress opted for a middle ground with the
193
substantial-justification standard.
The term “substantial justification,” although not defined within the
194
EAJA, was not a new standard. It was a concept borrowed from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide a court with the ability
to impose attorney’s fees on parties who fail to cooperate with a
195
discovery request, unless they can show substantial justification. In that
context, the term is measured by whether a reasonable person would
196
consider the party to be bound to comply with discovery. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the EAJA’s use of “substantially
197
justified” under the same reasonableness test. The Court said that to
avoid liability for fees, the government has the burden to show that its
198
position has a “reasonable basis both in law and fact.” The Ninth
Circuit has noted that the government’s “position” includes not only the
position taken during litigation, but also in the action on which the
199
litigation is based.
It is well established that, under the EAJA, the fact that the
government has lost on the merits does not by itself raise a presumption
200
that the government’s position was without substantial justification.
Instead, the inquiry takes “a fresh look at the case” and considers the
201
government’s decision to pursue a claim or to defend one. In Pierce v.
Underwood, the Supreme Court affirmed an award under the newly202
enacted EAJA. The dispute arose from a challenge to the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development’s refusal to implement a subsidy
203
program authorized by federal statute. After the case settled, the
204
plaintiffs moved for an attorney’s fees award under the EAJA. In
affirming the award granted by the lower courts, the Court reexamined
the merits of the government’s position to determine whether it was

192. H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 139.
193. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 14 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4993.
194. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of
Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 La. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1995)
[hereinafter Sisk, Part Two].
195. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5), (b)(2).
196. 8B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2288 (3d ed. 2010).
197. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 556 (1988).
198. Id. at 565.
199. Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 123 F.3d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 131 F.3d 842
(9th Cir. 1997).
200. Sisk, Part Two, supra note 194, at 23–24.
201. Id. at 24.
202. 487 U.S. at 571.
203. Id. at 555.
204. Id. at 557.
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205

substantially justified. The Court found that it was not, noting that the
government had weak legal support for its argument and pointing to the
government’s erroneous statutory interpretation and misplaced reliance
206
on precedent.
In contrast to the EAJA, the “frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation” standard advanced in Zipes and Christianburg places the
burden of persuasion on the prevailing party instead of the losing one. In
Pierce, the Court drew a specific distinction between the two standards,
explaining that “substantially justified” means “more than merely
207
undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness.” In other words, the EAJA
standard sets a standard for the government more demanding than
simply a showing that their position was not frivolous. Thus, under the
EAJA, the government must make a significant showing that their
position was substantially justified in order to avoid fees, unlike the Zipes
rule, where a prevailing party must make a stronger showing of
frivolousness in order to collect fees from an intervenor. One final key
difference between the standards is that the EAJA, unlike many other
civil rights fee-shifting statutes, sets a specific ceiling on the hourly rate of
attorney’s fees that may be awarded, unless the court determines that
208
some special factor warrants higher fees.
California courts are no strangers to the substantial-justification
standard. The language regarding sanctions for discovery misconduct in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (from which the substantialjustification standard in the EAJA was borrowed) is mirrored in the
209
counterpart rule in the California Code of Civil Procedure. Elsewhere
in California law, the standard is already used in reference to prevailing
parties’ entitlement to attorney’s fees against the state government,
210
211
specifically in the rules governing tax and insurance proceedings.
205. Id. at 569–71.
206. Id. The Court did not consider whether the government’s position fell below the lower
standard of being “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” because only the “substantially
justified” standard was relevant under the EAJA. See id. at 578 (Brennan, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 566.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2010). The current limit is $125 per hour. Id. To determine the fee
rate, courts calculate a lodestar figure by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on
litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. 14A Wright et al., supra note 196, § 3660.1; see also Sisk, Part
Two, supra note 194, at 108.
209. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2023.010–.040 (2010); see also id. § 1987.2 (“[T]he court may inits
discretion award . . . expenses . . . including reasonable attorney’s fees” incurred by a motion or
opposition to subpoena documents if done so “in bad faith or without substantial justification . . . .”).
210. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 7156(c)(2)(A)(i) (2010) (providing that a prevailing party
in a case against the state shall be entitled to reasonable litigation costs if the state’s position was not
substantially justified); see also Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 32469, 43520 (2010) (providing that
taxpayers are entitled to fees and expenses for certain types of hearings before the tax board upon a
finding that the board’s position was not substantially justified); Nw. Energetic Serv., LLC v. Cal.
Franchise Tax Bd., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 664–65 (Ct. App. 2008) (contrasting the substantialjustification standard with the private attorney general theory found in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5

Slevin_63-HLJ-860 (Do Not Delete)

894

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/26/2012 5:34 PM

[Vol. 63:867

C. The Proposal
This Note’s proposal is to hold losing intervening initiative
proponents to the same middle-ground standard to which the federal
government is held under the EAJA. This would create a possibility that
those nonprevailing proponents would be at least partly liable for the
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees under applicable fee-shifting law, because the
unsuccessful proponents would be required to show that their position
was substantially justified.
The proposal represents a balance of interests, just like the EAJA.
First, adopting the substantial-justification standard instead of the
frivolousness standard would make a finding of liability for the
defendant-intervenor more likely. This is because the burden of
persuasion is shifted from the prevailing plaintiff that is moving for fees
to the initiative proponent that seeks to avoid paying them. This would
result in the same deterrent effect on initiative proponents that is at the
core of the public policy behind the EAJA, which is to deter
212
Proponents would be less likely to promulgate or
wrongdoing.
subsequently defend a potentially unconstitutional initiative if they
anticipate being liable for a challenger’s attorney’s fees as a matter of
213
course. Instead, they would choose to participate merely as amici
curiae and not become an active party in litigation, as long as the
government is defending the law.
At the same time, using the substantial-justification standard avoids
a rule that would almost always hold the intervenor liable as a matter of
course. As discussed, such a policy goes against the basic rationale
behind the American Rule of not deterring lawsuits, and also might
implicate concerns with regard to proponents’ political expression as
214
litigants. Like the standard in the EAJA, where Congress wanted to
215
the substantialavoid a chilling effect on government action,
justification standard would not discourage initiative proponents too
strongly. And by leaving open the possibility that the state could share in
the fee award, an application of this standard would recognize the state’s
contributory role in enacting voter initiatives, regardless of whether the
216
state then choose to defend them in court.
(2010)).
211. See Cal. Ins. Code § 737(d) (2010).
212. See supra Part III.B.
213. But see supra note 148 (discussing that given the expense of some proposition campaigns,
attorney’s fees may not have a deterring effect in all cases).
214. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the First Amendment argument raised in Charles); supra Part
II.A. (discussing the policy behind the American Rule).
215. H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 139.
216. The interest of nondeterrence would also be served by applying a ceiling on the awardable fee
rates, much the way the EAJA does. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2010). However, this Note does
not suggest such a limit should be imposed. In Pierce v. Underwood, the Court explained that the
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Using the substantial-justification standard also would leave room
for the courts’ discretion in finding joint liability. If the intervenor’s
position were found not to be substantially justified, the proportion of
the fees for which the intervenor was liable would then depend on the
facts. The questions of whether the state was an active defendant and
whether there were other defendant-intervenors in the case whose
positions were not substantially justified would be largely determinative.
For example, in a case where the initiative proponents actively defended
the law alongside the state and there was a finding that the proponent’s
position was not substantially justified, the court could order the
plaintiff’s fees to be split evenly between the proponent and the state.
Or, in a case where the initiative proponents defended the law and the
state was silent, perhaps the fees could be divided unevenly, with the
proponents owing a greater percentage. And at the opposite end of the
spectrum, in a case like Perry, where the intervenor is the sole defendant
and the state has affirmatively stated that it is not behind the challenged
law, a court could potentially hold the defendant-intervenors fully liable
for fees.
D. Implementation
In the federal system, the implementation of the substantialjustification standard for intervening initiative proponents in civil rights
cases could be accomplished in a number of ways. First, initiativelitigation cases could simply be distinguished from the existing precedent.
Neither Zipes, nor Charles, nor Reed was a ballot-initiative challenge
defended by initiative proponents. Therefore, the new standard could be
judicially created, just as the Zipes standard was. The Supreme Court or
a federal appellate court could create this new standard while still
preserving Zipes in one of two ways. First, it could limit that case’s
217
holding to apply to only plaintiff-intervenors, as the Third Circuit did.
Alternately, it could provide that Zipes does in fact apply broadly to all
civil rights intervenors, but then carve out a specific exception to the
Zipes standard for initiative proponents. With Perry currently
progressing through the federal court system, an opportunity may arise
to promulgate this new standard. But the most efficient and effective
method would be for Congress to create this exception, borrowing the
substantial-justification standard from the EAJA just as it did originally
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
EAJA fee cap was put in place because “Congress thought that . . . [it] was generally quite enough
public reimbursement for lawyers’ fees.” 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988). So if the policy behind the ceiling
was to avoid assessing excessive fees against taxpayers, it is not applicable in the case of initiative
proponents who have raised millions of dollars in funding to support their law.
217. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen., 297 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2002); supra
Part I.A.2.
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In California, as in other states with their own attorney’s fees law,
putting this new standard into effect would be even simpler. Zipes is not
binding on state courts, and the Connerly decision was an expressly
narrow one addressing only the liability of an amicus curiae. Thus the
California Supreme Court, particularly with its tradition of independent
218
attorney’s fees jurisprudence, has the discretion to adopt a distinct
standard for initiative litigation. Further, the unpublished In re Marriage
Cases decision by the California Court of Appeal already has provided a
strong rationale supporting liability for initiative proponents who have
taken an active role in the litigation. Finally, because the substantial219
justification standard is familiar to California courts, applying it in this
context would not be a far stretch. The California Supreme Court could
do so in the next civil rights challenge that is brought successfully against
an enacted voter initiative in California state courts and in which a
220
proponent intervenes.

Conclusion
It is unfair for defendant-intervenors to avoid nearly all chance of
liability for attorney’s fees for unsuccessful civil rights defenses of laws
they sought to enact but which turn out to be illegal. The Zipes standard
is inappropriate for initiative litigation in any of the twenty-five
jurisdictions where such suits may arise. But because automatically
holding nonprevailing initiative proponents liable for fees might have too
great a deterrent effect on participating in such litigation, a middle
ground is needed. The Equal Access to Justice Act, with its substantialjustification standard, provides an ideal solution. Legislators and courts
at both the federal and state levels have the ability to apply this standard
to defendant-intervenors in initiative litigation. The pending Proposition
8 litigation could provide the perfect opportunity to implement such a
standard.

218. See supra Part I.B.1.
219. See supra Part III.B.
220. Of which there are likely to be many. See Hon. Ronald M. George, Keynote Address, 62 Stan.
L. Rev. 1515, 1518 (2010) (“The [California Supreme Court] frequently is called upon to resolve legal
challenges to voter initiatives.”). The California Supreme Court’s dicta in finding that
Protectmarriage.com had standing to appeal makes intervention by proponents seem nearly
mandatory. See Perry III, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024 (2011) (“The initiative power would be significantly
impaired if there were no one to assert the state’s interest in the validity of the measure when elected
officials decline to defend it in court or to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.”). On
February 13, 2012, the Ninth Circuit heard arguments in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v.
Brown, Nos. 11-15100, 11-15241 (9th Cir. filed May 23, 2011), an appeal from a constitutional
challenge to California’s Proposition 209, in which Governor Jerry Brown has declined to defend the
law. Bob Egelko, Affirmative Action Suit Gets Brown’s Support, S.F. Chron., Jan. 17, 2012, at C-1; see
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 5094278 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2010)
(granting the defendant-intervenors’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint).

